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ABSTRACT
PATCO STRIKE
A NEW BEGINNING FOR LABOR RELATIONS
Michael H. Grine
The University of North Dakota Graduate Center, 1988
Faculty Advisor:

Dr. Orville Goulet

While the actual events of the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike against
the federal government have faded into history, the
results of the strike will live forever in the new
management/labor relationship that exists, not only in
the federal government, but all levels of government and
civilian enterprise.

The results of the disastrous

failure of the strike destroyed thousands of careers and
left all levels of organized labor to foresee their now
limited options available for negotiations with
management.
This independent study will attempt to inform the
reader of the causes of the PATCO disaster and the
miscalculations (on both sides) that resulted in
personal tragedy for the union, and absolute victory for
the federal government.

The sources for the information
vi

contained herein are the fifty-seven magazines listed
in the bibliography.

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Although it is now history, the strike against the
federal government in the summer of 1981 by the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
(PATCO) created a labor/management relationship that has
endured to today.
One disadvantage for the union at the onset of
their differences with the federal government was the
fact.that this was the first major test of the Reagan
administration's ability to deal with a labor crises.
PATCO was extremely unhappy with the positions taken by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the
Carter administration, and PATCO had been one of only
three unions to endorse Reagan during his campaign. At
the onset of the difficulty the Reagan advisers worked
"feverishly to deal with their complaints and avoid an
embarrassing confrontation. 111
111 The Race to Head Off an Airline Shutdown,"

Business Week, 16 February 1981, 83.
1

2
The air traffic controllers had several goals that
they felt had to be met by the federal government.
of the primary demands was a

shorter work week.

One
PATCO

felt their work was far more demanding and nervewracking than that of any other civilian job in
government, and felt this fact was verified by the
mandatory retirement age of 56. 2

The controllers

wanted to reduce the 40 hour work week to 32 hours.

The

consequences to the government of this benefit would
have required hiring 20% more controllers.
The union's president at the time of the
confrontation, Robert Poli, was, prior to his election
as president of the union, vice-president.

The former

president of the union was ousted, primarily for not
being forceful enough in negotiations with the federal
government, and with this back~round, Poli appeared
eager to take on the government. 3

A PATCO strike plan

was obtained by the government soon after Poli's
election that contained information on members obtaining food stamps and advice on how to behave if arrested.
Publicly, Poli denied that PATCO planned a strike. 4
Fueling the grievances of the controllers was their
2 Ibid., 84.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.

3

perception that they were grossly underpaid.

Although

most of them had accepted their employment straight out
of high school, with all training provided by the
government after being selected for employment.

The

controllers felt they should be more closely aligned to
commercial pilots, who were then making up to $110,000 a
year.

The high range for controllers was $37,000 to

$49,000 a year. 5

As stated by one Transportation

Department official:

"I have to ask myself why an air

traffic controller should be paid as much as the cabinet
secretaries [who are paid $69,630 a year]."
Historically, strikes by federal employees have
been found to be illegal, and are usually halted by
injunctions.

When asked to comment on this fact, Robert

Poli stated "An injunction would not stop a PATCO
strike.

If you go back [to work] because of an

injunction you should not have gone out [on strike] in
the first place.

You lose. 116

During another

interview, Poli stated "The only illegal strike is an

611 controllers Stress Need For Continuation of

Talks," Aviation

&

Space Technology, 9 March 1981, 261.

4

unsuccessful one. 117
Another benefit requested by PATCO was a retirement
plan that would allow controllers to retire after 20
years with a 75% pension, based on their highest yearly
salary.

The plan in effect prior to the strike allowed

a 50% pension based on the three highest salary years,
and required most controllers to be 50 years old to
retire. 8
Funding for any benefit that would be agreed upon
by the FAA would have to be appropriated by Congress.
PATCO backed a House bill that was sponsored by William
Clay (Democrat, Missouri) that would have increased the
average controller's salary from $33,000 a year to at
least $43,000 a year, reduce the work week from 40 to 32
hours and permit full retirement benefits after 20 years
service. 9 The FAA estimated this package would cost
$744 million in the first year alone.

The package

offered by the FAA included a reduction in the work week
to 37\ hours, higher pay for night shifts, a 10% pay
raise to controllers who give on-the-job training and a
year's severance pay to experienced controllers forced
711 The.Air Controllers Lobby For More Pay,"

Business Week, 4 May 1981, 55.
8 Ibid., 58.
9 Tom Nicholson, Joyce Barnatham, and John
Concannon, "Air Controllers on Hold," Newsweek, 29 June
1981, 56.

.

I

11

5

off the job for medical reasons.

This package was

estimated to cost $40 million per year. 10

The

government felt that while it was trying to reduce the
federal budget, a generous package would encourage other
federal employees to seek budget-breaking increases.
In June 1981 Poli and the union leadership agreed
to the $40 million package, due to the fact that Poli
didn't have the required 80% of the membership
supporting a strike.

The rank-and-file overwhelmingly

rejected the offer, and the union presented new demands
estimated to cost the government $490 million to $681
million annually.11
Secretary of Transportation (under whom the FAA
falls) Drew Lewis was furious, and called the demands
"nothing short of outrageous. 1112

He offered to

"redistribute" the $40 million package as the union
desired, and requested a postponement of the strike
deadline (an offer that will come back to haunt PATCO as
explained in chapter 3).

PATCO refused.

PATCO's position in striking against the government
would be extremely tenuous due to previous events.
lOibid.
1111 Another Threat of Airline Chaos," Newsweek,
10 August 1981, 54.
12 Ibid.

In

6

June of 1969 some 450 controllers protested against the
government by staying off the job and claiming to be
sick.

The FAA declared that PATCO had encouraged the

sickout, and that it would no longer recognize the
union.

In the spring of 1970 some 3,000 controllers

claimed illness and stayed off the job.

The FAA fired

some 100 local PATCO leaders, and temporarily suspended
the sickout participants.

In order to regain

certification as a bargaining unit, PATCO formally
pledged to never again encourage a work stoppage or
engage in a strike. 13

13 Ed Magnuson, Gary Lee, and Peter Stoler,
"Turbulence in the Tower," Time, 17 August 1981, 17

CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF STRIKE

While at first glance a strike against the federal
government would appear foolish, as it is against the
law, and every controller had signed an oath on
commencement of his/her employment promising not to
participate in a strike against the federal government.
Looking

deeper into the history of such strikes one

can follow the reasoning that may have existed in the
minds of the PATCO membership.

There had been at least

22 local or unauthorized strikes against the government
in the recent years prior to the PATCO strike.

In 1962

the first of eight strikes by craft workers against the
government's Tennessee Valley Authority occurred.
Eighty workers were fired--none were rehired.

In 1969

almost 500 air traffic controllers participated in a two
day "sick-in" with no disciplinary action taken.

In

1969, 72 postal workers in Massachusetts struck for two
days over wages.

Agreement was reached, and no

disciplinary action was taken.
7

In 1970 four actions

8

against the government occurred.

Over two thousand air

traffic controllers participated in a "sick-in."
were fired, but 59 of them were later rehired.

Sixty
Over

152,000 postal workers went on strike for higher wages.
The government agreed to negotiate, and no disciplinary
action was taken.

Fourteen hundred employees of the

government printing office went on strike over wages.

A

compromise agreement was reached, and no disciplinary
action was taken.

Ninety seven job corps advisers at

Camp Attebury, Indiana, went on strike--no disciplinary
action was taken.

In 1971 35 employees of the Library

of Congress went on strike.

Thirteen were fired.

In

1973 another strike against the Tennessee Valley
Authority resulted in 192 dismissals, but all were later
reinstated following appeals.

In 1974, 475 postal

workers in New Jersey went on strike.

A federal judge

ordered arbitration and no disciplinary action was
taken.

In 1976 33 federal policemen at Washington

National Airport called in sick.
was taken.

No disciplinary action

In 1978, 4,750 postal workers in New Jersey

and California staged a wildcat strike.
fired,

Though 226 were

104 of them were later rehired. 1

In 1947 a portion of the Taft-Hartly Act allowed
the government to fire striking workers and to refuse to
111 Challenge to the Government," U.S. News & World

Report, 17 August 1981, 18.

9

rehire them.

In 1955 Congress passed HR6590, signed

into law as PL84-330 without controversy, making
strikes against the government a crime punishable by a
fine and imprisonment.

The specification of strikes

against the government was one of four prohibitions
specified in the law.
Supreme Court in 1971. 2

These laws were upheld by the
Despite these laws, not one

striker had ever been convicted prior to the PATCO
strike.

In fact, amnesty for the strikers was normally

part of the return-to-work agreement.

As years went by,

these strikes assumed a "business-as-usual" style. 3
The history of strikes against the government that
led the officers of PATCO to believe that their own
strike could succeed without retribution can be most
aptly illustrated with the postal strike of March, 1970.
On March 18, 1970, letter carriers in New York City
began their walkout, and the walkout quickly spread to
other cities.

By March 20, there were pickets marching

in Chicago, Philadelphia, Newark, Buffalo, Cleveland,
St. Paul, Detroit, and East Lansing. 4

The Government

obtained restraining orders, but they were ignored by
2 Ibid., 17.
3 Ibid.
411 Strikes Against the Public," U.S. News
Report, 30 March 1970, 21.

&

World

10
the strikers.

The same federal laws that affected PATCO

were in effect at this time, and made the striking
carriers liable for a fine of $1,000, a year in prison,
or both.

As U.S. News

&

World Report stated, "Who does

what to enforce such a law? 115
One of the several differences between the postal
carrier strike and the PATCO strike was the glaring
validity to many of the carriers' complaints.

The

salary range in effect when the strike began was $6,176
for new workers, increasing to $8,442 after 21 years on
the job. 6

This salary was on a nation-wide basis, and

the carrier living and working in New York City was paid
equally with the carrier living and working in Minot,
North Dakota, even though the cost of living was vastly
different.

The carriers were demanding an increased

range to $8,500 for new employees to $11,700 after five
years.
$7,335.

The average salary at the time of the strike was
This was a marked difference with the average

PATCO salary of $33,000 in 1980, and explains the
different attitude and strategy employed by the
Government in the resolution of the confrontation.

It

also explains why there was such a difference in public
sympathy and labor support with the carriers' strike.

11
In July, 1969, postal workers were given a 4.1% pay
increase while the rest of the federal employees got a
9.1% pay increase.

The explanation offered was that

"postal-pay raises in earlier years had gotten ahead of
the others. 117
The wildcat strike eventually involved some 200,000
out of the total 740,000 postal workers, stretching
through fifteen states coast to coast. 8

On March 23,

1970, President Nixon mobilized 24,000 troops to move
the mail.

President Nixon made the statement "What is

at issue is the survival of a Government based upon
law. 119

As events progressed, the troops were only

used in New York City.

The government took the position

that they would not negotiate until the workers went
back·to their jobs.

The carriers agreed to this term,

with the understanding that if an agreement was not
reached within one week, they would be walking off their
jobs again.

Fortunately for the country, an agreement

was reached.
Beside the differences already mentioned between
the 1970 postal strike and the 1981 PATCO strike,
perhaps the largest difference between the two strikes
7 I'Dl. d

. ,

22.

811 Postal Strike--The Effect," U.S. News & World

Report, 6 April 1970, 16-17.
9 Ibid., 17.

12
was the totality of the strike.

The post office strike,

though it involved cities in fifteen states coast to
coast, did not affect the entire postal system, as did
the PATCO strike affect the entire air traffic control
system.

The postal strike involved approximately

200,000 employees out of 740,000 nation wide, while the
PATCO strike involved approximately 13,000 out of 15,000
air traffic controllers.

This difference probably

contributed heavily to the gross miscalculations of
PATCO in their thinking that the Government would be
powerless in the confrontation.
In addition to the historical data of successful
strikes against the government, PATCO felt that with
13,000 of the 15,000 membership participating in the
strike, it would be impossible for the government to
operate the air traffic system without them.

In

addition to the almost certain financial disaster to the
country caused by failure of the system, a mid-air
collision with the potential loss of hundreds of lives
appeared probable (to PATCO's thinking), which would
force an immediate reconciliation by the government.
President Reagan felt the strike violated a moral
trust, and was quoted as saying:

"I respect the right

of workers in the private sector to strike.

Indeed, as

president of my own union, I led the first strike ever

13
called by the union [the Screen Actors Guild,
1959]. 1110
The potential financial loss resulting from failure
of the air traffic system would have been catastrophic!
Passenger airlines were carrying 800,000 passengers per
day, and 10,000 tons of air cargo.

The immediate loss

of this revenue would be more than $30 billion per year
and 340,000 jobs with the airlines.

Every day the

airlines were purchasing $31 million of fuel.

Large

corporations (Boeing, etc.) had air carriers as their
primary market.

The ripple effects of the industry

(fresh food, fresh flowers, health care, bank checks,
etc.) had been estimated at 3% of the entire American
gross national product. 11

Dislocation of the U.S.

economy was exactly what the striking air traffic
controllers hoped to accomplish, but as James Burnham,
White House economist stated:

"I don't believe that

this strike, as it has developed, will have any
measurable impact on the gross national product or any
other national economic statistic. 1112
If PATCO had counted on public sympathy to aid them
in their fight against the government, they had badly
lO"Turbulence in the Tower," 16.
11 christopher Byron, Benjamin w. Cate, and
Christopher Redman, "The Economic Perils of Chaos
Aloft," Time, 17 August 1981, 22-23.
12 Ibid., 22.

14
miscalculated.

Newsweek commissioned the Gallup

organization to conduct a public poll of 611 adults on
August 6 and 7.

To the question "From what you know of

the situation, are your sympathies more with the air
traffic controllers or more with the government?" 29% of
the respondents replied air traffic controllers, 52%
replied the government, and 8% replied neither.

To the

question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way
President Reagan is handling the strike?" 57% replied
approve and 30% replied disapprove.

To the question "Do

you think the job of the air traffic controllers is so
demanding that they were justified in going out on
strike or do you think the air traffic controllers were
wrong in breaking their oath and the law which forbids
strikes by federal employees?" 23% replied justified and
67% replied wrong. 1 3
Another miscalculation made by PATCO was due to the
presidential endorsement mentioned earlier in this
paper.

PATCO was one of only three unions that endorsed

Reagan during his campaign, and Poli received a letter
from Reagan thanking him for the support, and promising
to establish "a spirit of cooperation" between the White
House and the controllers.

A White House official was

quoted as saying "Poli thought he would wave that letter
13 Tom Morganthau et al., "Who Controls the Air?"
Newsweek, 17 August 1981, 21.

15
and get what he wanted.

It was rediculous. 1114

Besides overrating the value of their campaign
endorsement and erroneously believing their strike
would cause chaos in the skies, Poli failed to
coordinate and seek advice or support from other unions.
Mutual support from other unions should have been the
strongest and most certain support received by PATCO,
but due to either miscalculation or conceited
overestimation of their own power, this support was
almost nonexistent.
In addition to the Newsweek poll, almost all of the
inconvenienced travelling public was harshly critical of
the controllers.

As one lady said after spending an

additional $1200 and two days traveling time to return
to Detroit from London, "[The strikers are] capitalizing
on human misery to get their demands across. 1115

14 Ibid., 22.
15 Tom Morganthau et al.,
The Planes Keep
Flying," Newsweek, 24 August 1981, 17.
11

CHAPTER 3
EFFECTS AND OUTCOME

On August 3, 1981, the PATCO membership walked off
their job in a direct confrontation with the federal
government.

President Reagan, angry at the union for

ignoring his warnings, unleashed the full power of the
federal government, and slammed into the union with the
force of a jumbo jet .
. By the end of the week, 5,100 of the 13,000
striking controllers had received their dismissal
notices.

U.S. marshals, under orders from federal

judges, arrested five local union leaders, and hauled
them off to jail.

In some locations, standard federal

arrest procedures were used, entailing the use of
handcuffs, and waist to feet chains, adding a note of
high drama for the media covering the arrests.

Federal

judges assessed fines that cumulative added up to more
than $1 million per day for each day of the strike.
union's $3.5 million strike fund was frozen by the
16

The

17
courts, in effect bankrupting the union. 1
The government also moved to ensure that the air
traffic control system would remain operable.

Some 500

military air controllers were immediately ordered to
supplement the ATC facilities, with plans for up to
2,000 more military controllers to be worked into the
system.

Fifty eight towers at small, lightly used

airports were ordered closed, and the non-striking
controllers and supervisors at those towers were
transferred to busier duty.

Red tape was cut on 500 job

applicants with prior air controller experience.
Retired controllers were asked to come back to work. 2
The air controller academy at Oklahoma City had
been turning out 1900 controllers a year operating with
one shift of instructors.

Plans were developed to

triple that output by operating the academy on a 24 hour
schedule.

There were 9,000 applicants on the waiting

list prior to the strike, and the strike spurred 11,000
people to inquire about admission to the school. 3
Poli was stunned by the government's actions, and
accused the government of "brutal overkill."

He was

111 Turbulence in the Tower," 14.
211 Moves to Replace Those Air Strikers," U.S. Ne1-rn
&

World Report, 17 August 1981, 8.
3 rbid.

18

quoted as saying "There's more effort going into
busting [sic] our union than there is into fighting drug
abuse or organized crime.

We're a very small union. 114

Of the 15,000 members of PATCO, approximately
13,000 joined the strike at its initiation.

When Reagan

issued the ultimatum of returning to work within 48
hours (later lengthened to 68 hours) approximately 1,200
strikers abandoned the strike and returned to work.
Just three days after the strike had begun,
Secretary of Transportation Lewis, reflecting the
position of the government, declared that the strike was
over, and those controllers who had not returned to work
were no longer employees of the FAA.
The total number of employees who stayed on the job
or returned to work under the 48 hour grace period was
approximately 5,000.

The upper levels of government

understood the difficulty those people would have if the
strikers were ever allowed to return, and therefore,
rehiring the striking workers at some future date was a
dead issue.

One former controller, now a supervisor at

Los Angeles radar center said during the strike "It's a
manager's dream.

The snivelers, the criers and the

whiners are out there in the sun.

Everybody who has

4 Tom Morganthau et al., "Who Controls the Air?"
21.

19
come to work has come to work! 115

The feeling among

those who stayed on the job was that the friction
between themselves and returning strikers (if ever
rehired) would be unbearable.

One nonunion worker in

Miami stated ''I'll work seven days a week, 16 hours a
day, to keep them from coming back. 116
By the fourth week of the strike, the striking
PATCO membership had met unforeseen hard times.

The

union was having a difficult time keeping the membership
in line.

Due to the legal action taken against the

union, there were no strike benefits available to the
members, and in most states they did not qualify for
welfare payments.

Members were taking whatever jobs

they could find, be it painting houses or any other
manual labor.

Most were not favorably received by

employers, due to the fact that the employers believed
the strike would be settled at some point and the
controllers would go back to their jobs.

There was at

least one case of ~uicide, with the dismissal notice
left beside the corpse.
By late August the FAA had received 77,000
applications for controller training.
5

PATCO president

Ed Magnuson, Gisela Bolte, and Dean Brelis, "The
Skies Grow Friendlier," Time, 24 August 1981, 15.
6 Ibid., 16.

20

Robert Poli offered a carefully hedged venture to the
government that he would step down from the union
presidency if it would promote negotiations. 7
In late October, the final blow to PATCO was
received.

The Federal Labor Relations Authority revoked

PATCO's right to represent the air traffic controllers.
This was the first time that a union representing
federal .employees had been decreed out of existence. 8
Poli vowed he would appeal the decision.
The individual striker had all hope of returning to
work as an air traffic controller dashed on December 9,
1981, when President Reagan issued a statement that "as
an act of compassion" he would allow the controllers to
apply for government jobs, but not in the Federal
Aviation Administration.

Poli called the statement a

"cruel hoax. 119
By early January 1982 Poli was still publicly
stating that he thought "public sympathy will
7

Tom Morganthau, and Howard Fineman, "The Flights
Get Smoother," Newsweek, 31 August 1981, 21.
8

walter Isaacson, and Gisela Bolte, "Flying the
Emptier Skies," Time, 2 November 1981, 29.
911

&

Compassion or Hoax for Air Strikers?" U.S. News
World Report, 21 December 1981, 12.

21
eventually get his members back to work. 1110
stated "They've got their pound of flesh.

He
There aren't

any excessive demands anymore. 1111
On January 6, 1982, Poli resigned as president of
PATCO, stating that he hoped his resignation could lead
to resumption of negotiations.

The new president, Gary

W. Eads, former regional (Kansas City) vice president,
stated that he thought the PATCO fight could last
another two or three years.

The FAA stated that the

change in union administration would have no effect on
their decision to decertify the union. 12
In mid 1982 Poli was quoted as saying he still
thinks he did the right thing.
it. 1113

"The strike was worth

At the same time, PATCO was down to a clerical

staff of two, with 14 volunteers.

About 50% of the

strikers have found full-time jobs, with about 200
employed as air traffic controllers for private
contractors in the Middle East, Australia and New
Guinea.

Two hundred applied for other U.S. civil-

lO"Loser of the Year," Forbes, 4 January 1982,
199.

12 Michael Feazel, "PATCO Chief Anticipates Long
Fight for Solution," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
11 January 1982, 38.
1311 PATCO Strikers Find Going Tough," Newsweek,
28 June 1982, 12.

22
service jobs, but only 36 had been approved, and none
had received a specific assignment. 14
To all except the most unrealistic eyes, the union
was gone, and with it, the jobs of over 10,000 striking
employees.

14 Ibid.

CHAPTER 4
NEW LABOR/MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP

The effect of PATCO's disastrous failure was
recognized by other labor leaders, even while it was
happening.

The most immediate effect could be seen with

the postal workers, who had negotiated a new contract
with the government in July, and were now getting ready
to vote on it.

On a wider scale, it seemed to send a

signal to state and local governments to resist
unreasonable demands of their employees.

Reagan's

reaction could even be interpreted as a warning to all
labor leaders
programs. 1

to not stand in the way of any of his

At the least, the attack on PATCO

completely undermined a strategy decision by the
American Federation of Government Employees to adopt a
"confrontational" approach to hiring freezes and layoffs
111

Regan's Go-For-Broke Stand in the Air Strike,"
Business Week, 17 August 1981, 26.
23

24

planned by the administration. 2
Publicly, other labor leaders appeared supportive
of PATCO's cause.

AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland led a

group of top union officials, who were attending an
AFL-CIO executive council meeting in Chicago, to join a
group of PATCO pickets at O'Hare.

Present were Douglas

Fraser, president of the United Auto Workers, and
William Winpisinger, president of the machinists union
which handles airline baggage and services the jets
(services which could quickly ground most airlines if
stopped).

Winpisinger urged Reagan to quit "union

busting" and to "get rational and sit down to negotiate
an agreement. 113
Privately, the labor leaders were highly critical
of Poli and PATCO.

They believed Poli had acted rashly,

without proper planning and support.

Douglas Fraser

assessed what was happening, and conceded ''[The PATCO
strike] could do massive damage to the labor movement.
That's why PATCO should have talked to the AFL-CIO
council. 114

The labor leaders

were also critical of

2 Peter Gall, and John Hoerr, "How Labor Loses
From the PATCO Strike," Business Week, 24 August 1981,
35.
311 Turbulence in the Tower," 20.

25
Poli for failing to try to explain his union's issues
to members of Congress, and even turning down an offer
from a public relations firm to help him get his story
out to the American public.
The total failure of the strike and the effect on
other unions was summed best by an anonymous author in
Forbes, when he termed the strike "U.S. labor's greatest
disaster since the Ludlow Massacre. 115
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Loser of the Year," 199.

----·---------------------~-----------

CHAPTER 5
AIR CONTROLLERS TODAY

Over six years after the PATCO strike, many people
are still looking at the air traffic control system to
see if the strike and its aftermath have improved the
system, maintained the system, or caused a weakening of
the system.
There seems to be an agreement among experts in the
system that it is still understaffed, and the safety
criteria, so important in a transportation system so
dependent on public opinion, has been swept under the
carpet by the federal government.

Since deregulation,

the growth of the airline industry has been explosive.
Air traffic has increased by as much as 20% in some
cities, but there are 26% fewer qualified controllers at
work than before the strike.

Six day workweeks and

reduced vacation time were standard procedures. 1
1
Bob Cohn, "To Rehire or Not to Rehire?"
Newsweek, 23 November 1987, 55.
26

The
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number of near-misses increased almost 50% in the first
nine months of 1987.
The FAA still carries the "company line" and
declared that it would take just as long to train the
old PATCO controllers as it would to train the new
controllers.
There is increasing support in Congress to pass a
bill to force the federal government to rehire the PATCO
controllers, but it seems likely to be vetoed if it is
passed during the Reagan administration.

His handling

of the PATCO strike was what gave his administration its
initial "tough guy" image, and he appears unlikely to do
anything that would undermine that image. 2
With the heavy work-load that was born by the
controllers during the time subsequent to the PATCO
strike, conditions seemed ripe for the formation of a
new union.

With an experienced controller now making

$60,000 a year before overtime, pay was no longer a sore
point with the controllers as it was in 1981.

What

appeared to be the driving force behind the
establishment of a new union was the lack of say the
controllers felt in the operation of the air traffic
control system.

With the FAA attitude of "If you don't

like it, quit the job.

They're hiring at Burger King.",
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the formation of the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association was inevitable. 3
While the new air traffic controller system
initiated during the PATCO strike would seem to afford
the FAA the opportunity to correct the problems on the
management side that led to the strike, it apparently
was an opportunity that was totally missed.

The General

Accounting Office did a survey in 1986, and documented
"broad dissatisfaction among controllers and their
supervisors."

The problem was "the administration's

inability to deal successfully with its employees on a
human level, day in and day out. 114
The national coordinator for the new National Air
Traffic Controllers Association, John Thornton, a former
PATCO leader who lost his job and spent ten days in jail
for striking in 1981, leaves no doubt that the lessons
of the 1981 strike have been learned as far as the labor
side is concerned.

"Our members would think we were

crazy if we called a strike ... History proved PATCO
wrong.

NATCA's constitution says that we will use only

'lawful means' to better the controller's job.

That

means no strikes, no slowdowns. 115
3

John Merwin, "Talking Union," Forbes, 6 April
1987, 35.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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With the pay issue seemingly not the focus of the
union's new objectives, what is?

"The main issue will

be to attempt to have about 3,000 more controllers
hired." according to Thornton. 6
With the PATCO strike memory fading into history,
the bottom line appears to be what has changed because
of the strike and its aftermath?

The most visible (to

the American public) product of the air traffic
controllers is air safety.

Each accident is

investigated for months until the exact cause can be
determined, and then actions are taken to preclude
recurrence.

Whether the skies are more dangerous today

due to the FAA's reliance on a reduced number of air
traffic controllers and the painstakingly slow
replacement of antiquated equipment depends on the
viewpoint of the person being quoted.

So far,

it would

appear that the statistics on aviation accidents show
that the skies are still safe.

On the other side, there

are many experts saying that we are just lucky, and
there are potentially hundreds of accidents waiting to
happen.
Another result of the strike that is almost
universally agreed upon (with the exception of high
6
1987,

Alyssa A. Lappen, "Full Circle," Forbes, 13 July
12.
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ranking FAA officials) is that the FAA has continued
the error that was one of the causes of the strike;
there is a gross lack of communication between the FAA
and the controllers.

This was cited by the GAO in their

1987 survey, as previously mentioned, and also in survey
conducted by the FAA itself. 7
What has been the bottom line?

The air traffic

controllers have certainly gained favorable pay
increases since the strike, the controllers have learned
that they can not bring the system to its knees with an
illegal strike, and therefore must work within the
system for the changes believed necessary.

The skies may

or may not be just as safe as before the strike, and the
FAA continues to disregard inputs from the controllers
themselves on how the system should run.

7 Merwin, 35.
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